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I. Introduction*
The past four decades have seen the emergence and constant evolution of international
efforts to promote rule of law. Even though, historically, rule of law assistance began with
a regional focus on Latin America, during the last two decades it quickly expanded to
other regions of the world. Today, it is part of both bilateral and multilateral assistance
strategies designed to support democratic reform, encourage better governance, further
economic development and prosperity through different strategies and interventions to
secure legal empowerment and justice for the poor and traditionally disenfranchised
groups, foster security and lead interventions in conflict, combat terrorism and drug traf-
ficking, and support post-conflict reconstruction efforts in troubled societies among other
objectives.
The list of definitions and elements developed to explain what the rule of law is and
what the process and mechanisms behind its objectives are tends to be quite broad. In
many cases, they tend to be linked to the set of interventions and strategies a particular
organization has developed to respond to a particular societal challenge to the rule of law
as part of its own mandate.
At the same time, the field included an army of multi-lateral and international agencies,
lawyers, private foundations, legal and development consulting firms, human rights and
civil society activists, governments, armed forces, and aid providers. To do what? A rapid
answer says to foster and enforce a wide array of agendas while responding to some of the
most compelling challenges to democratic values, human rights, governance, stability,
peace, and economic development many societies and their citizens face. In other words,
to equip societies and their institutions with the necessary tools to make the rule of law a
reality.
If that is the end goal, what has the field-as engaged in the business of promoting the
rule of law abroad-learned over the course of four decades? While the task of answering
this question can seem quite daunting, for those engaged in this process, it remains a
compelling exercise. A growing number of practitioners working on rule of law reform
initiatives are beginning to acknowledge that while most of the challenges faced emerge as
programs and initiatives are implemented elsewhereI they must foster these conversations
in their own countries if they are to respond to the challenges ahead. In other words,
more of the same does not work and practitioners need to understand what has happened
so far in order to be able to project new strategies and interventions that are responsive to
what lies ahead. With one more caveat: these conversations should also keep in mind the
folks on the ground, the citizens of the host countries where these interventions take place
and the different societal, cultural, political, and legal traditions that they are aimed at
targeting and reforming.
This is a powerful argument that challenges both practitioners themselves and the rule
of law community of practice as a whole to think in different terms. It implies that they
need to step back from merely engaging in designing and implementing projects in a
reactionary mood and begin engaging in a different conversation among those engaged in
this process.
* Lelia Mooney authored this section.
1. SeeJamesA. Goldston, TheRule ofLaw at Home andAbroad, 1 HAGUEJ. ON THE RULE OF L. 38 (2009).
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Over the course of these past four decades, they have been able to learn and understand
that technical approaches to rule of law reform are that merely focus on strengthening
institutions, training justice sector professionals, lawyers and bar associations, reforming
laws and legal frameworks among others, while effective, do not deliver by themselves
long lasting and sustainable changes.
Even more, any outside intervention, particularly one aiming at fostering the rule of law
in any particular setting, cannot avoid exploring what the political arrangements of a par-
ticular society are and how different political, civil, society, and human rights stakeholders
can have and should have a stake in this discussion. Furthermore, this exploration also
demands a careful look at how a society has contributed to perpetuating discriminatory
notions of justice, while at the same time understanding the potential that same society
has (and the opportunity it has) in becoming a strong defender and re-builder of a more
democratic, socially inclusive, just, and prosperous future for its own citizens.
As the scope of the rule of law agenda keeps expanding, so does the need to put these
experiences and lessons learned into perspective and it is compelling to start with that
exercise here, among those of us engaged in the field to better frame an integrated conver-
sation instead of one that responds to only specific arguments or approaches in total dis-
connect with the challenges, dreams, and aspirations citizens face on the ground.
This entails beginning by conducting a critical exploration on the lessons learned from
the evolution of the rule of law field, its setbacks and some of the challenges ahead. That
is the precise objective of this paper that grew out of a live dialogue that was organized as
part of a series that focused on promoting development, governance, and the rule of law
abroad. It will try to do so by focusing the participants of this dialogue on three funda-
mental themes.
First, Martin Schonteich from the Open Society Justice Initiative will explore how the
rule of law movement became what it is today and how its evolution contributed to shap-
ing its current focus. Second, Jennifer Windsor from Freedom House will draw on Free-
dom in the World survey data to assess trends and challenges in the evolution of rule of law
and will outline the critical role that human rights defenders can play in ensuring that rule
of law systems actually deliver justice and equality to all citizens while securing those
systems respect and enforce human rights. Third, Colette Rausch from the United States
Institute of Peace (USIP) will walk through the most compelling themes that the rule of
law field needs to consider as it evolves in a future that provides a secure and safe frame-
work for all people, where everybody has equal access to justice and protected human
rights.
Lastly, this paper will elaborate on some of the lessons that emerged out of this collec-
tive exploration as a way of responding to the current challenges and envisioning a differ-
ent kind of action to the challenges both practitioners and the rule of law community of
practice are facing here and elsewhere.
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II. How Rule Of Law Assistance is Evolving*
A. THE BEGINNINGS
The growth in rule of law assistance can be divided into a number of stages, beginning
with the law and development movement. While there is some debate about when it
began, a number of scholars identify its beginnings in the years immediately after World
War II.2 Shortly after the end of the war, modernization theory became prominent
through the work of U.S. economists, political scientists, and sociologists. It informed the
political development movement, which grew out of the spirit of optimism and confidence
that followed the triumph of the western Allies in World War 11.
This new way of thinking stressed that the less-developed world needed to emulate the
Western model of modernity, and pattern their society along Western lines in order to
progress. 4 Moreover, with the same economic, political, and social institutions in place as
in the developed West-free markets, liberal political institutions, and the rule of law-
Third-World development was deemed an inevitable, evolutionary process.5 Conse-
quently, the primary focus of foreign aid was to improve the effectiveness and capacity of
public institutions and centralized bureaucracies. Not much attention was given to judi-
ciaries other than "another public institution in need of technocratic enhancement." 6
For many, the law and development movement only commenced in the mid-1960s,
when the movement was motivated by ideas centered on both economic and democratic
development.7 In the 1960s, the law and development movement focused on a few coun-
tries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Projects tended to be small with a limited time
horizon, and funds were generally modest. Most of the funding came from U.S. private
foundations and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
The law and development movement sought to reform the judicial systems and substan-
tive laws of developing countries. Engaging legal scholars from prestigious American uni-
versities, the movement helped develop law faculties and legal education curricula in
developing countries. The objective was to provide law schools in less developed jurisdic-
tions with the capacity to train lawyers in the concepts and practices of Western-prima-
* Martin Sch6nteich authored this section.
2. See Thomas C. Heller, An Immodest Postscript, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRiCAL Ap-
PROACIILS TO TiiE RULE OF LAW 383 (Eric G.Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003); Erik G.Jensen, The
Rule ofLaw and Judicial Refom: The Political Economy ofDivene Institutional Patterns and Reformers' Responses, in
BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRucAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 345 (Eric G. Jensen &
Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003).
3. See RICHARD A. HIGGO-r, POLrnCAL DEVELOPMEF THEORY: TiHE CONrEMPORARY DEBATE
(1983).
4. See, e.g., DAVID ERNEST ArER, TulE POLICS OF MODERNIZATION (1965); DANIEL LERNER, THE
PASSING OF TRADTITONAL SocIEry: MODERNIZING THE MIDDLE EAsTr (1958); WAur WHr:1AN Ros-
TOW, THE STAGES OF EcONOMuc GROWrn, A NON-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (3d ed. 1990).
5. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-And-Development Studies, 89 AM. J. Is-rT'L L. 470, 470-86 (1995).
6. Jensen, supra note 2, at 346.
7. Tamnnaha, supra note 5, at 472; see also HARRY BLAIR & GARY HANSEN, WEIGHING IN ON THE
SCALES OFJUSTICE: STRATEGIc APPROACHES FOR DONOR-SUPPORTED RULE OF LAW PRocRAmS, USAID
PROGRAM & OPERATIONs ASSESSMENr REPORT No. 7, 7 (1994), available at http//www.usaid.gov/
our.-work/democracy-and-governance/publications/pdfs/pnaax280.pdf.
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rily U.S.-law to lead the economic and political modernization process in their
countries.8
The movement was largely based on the assumption that law is central to the develop-
ment process. Moreover, the law was understood as an "instrument that could be used to
reform society and that lawyers and judges could serve as social engineers."9 In other
words, law reform leads to social change, and a key driver of change is the law itself.
Emboldened by the civil rights movement in the United States, numerous U.S. lawyers
travelled to Africa and Latin America to promote a model whereby lawyers are activist
agents of change. A related assumption was that educating the legal profession in devel-
oping countries would advance reform efforts. In other words, to overcome the barrier
between the law as it appeared in the statutes and its actual application, it was necessary to
educate lawyers and judges to become legal activists. The law and development move-
ment paid less attention to legislatures, judiciaries, and practicing lawyers. This was not
"because they were thought to be less important, but because it was assumed that change
in the education system was the most effective way to bring about change in all other legal
institutions."10
The focus of the movement-both in respect of legal education and the development of
modern law-was on the development of commercial law and the training of commercial
lawyers in both the private and public sectors. This was not motivated by an indifference
to democracy promotion but rather based on a belief that democratic values were best
served through economic growth. Moreover, there was a basic understanding that, by
focusing on the promotion of both the private sector and the development of a market
economy, there was going to be a "spillover from an effective and instrumental orientation
in economic law to 'democracy values' like access to justice and the protection of civil
rights.""
B. SHIFTING THE Focus AND PRIORTIEs
In the mid- 1 970s, the focus shifted to the importance of alleviating poverty by meeting
basic needs and giving the poor a larger voice in the development process. One central
understanding of this new process was the importance of making legal services accessible
to the poor through legal aid projects. For example, USAID supported legal aid projects
in a number of countries, and the Ford and Asia Foundations pursued "legal aid as an
important objective and continued to refine their strategies in this sector throughout the
1970s and 1980s."12 Both Foundations "supported legal aid, mediation boards, law educa-
tion, and legal advocacy organizations."' 3
By the late 1970s a growing chorus of critics began to undermine the law and develop-
ment movement. "U.S. legal advisers working abroad were criticized for being ethnocen-
8. BLAIR & HANSEN, supra note 7, at 7-8.
9. World Bank, Law and Development Movement, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ITLAVIJUS-
TINST/Resources/LawandDevelopmentMovement.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2009).
10. David M. Trubek, The "Rule of Law" in Development Assistance: Past, Present, and Future, in THE NEW
LAW AND EcoNoMic DEVELOPMENT 77 (David M. Trubeck & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
11. Id.
12. BLAIR & HANsEN, supra note 7, at 8.
13. Id.
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tric, naive, and imperialistic."' 4 Modernization theorists despaired as developing
countries that had benefited from the movement failed to progress economically, exper-
ienced the weakening of their political institutions and, in the case of some, slid from
democratic to authoritarian rule. Questions arose about the practical and moral chal-
lenges involved in transplanting Western legal institutions. "In some cases, the transplants
did not 'take' place at all: some of the new laws promoted by the reformers remained on
the [statute] books but were ignored in action. In others, laws were captured by local
elites and put to uses different from those the reformers intended."1s
The impact of the educational reforms was modest at best as law schools proved resis-
tant to significant change. Crucially, the law and development movement's interventions
failed to bring about systemic change. Moreover, change in the economic sphere-lim-
ited as it was-did not result in the anticipated democratization gains and the protection
of individual rights. Theorists considered this to be "a real shock to Western liberal legal-
ists who had assumed that the legal system was a seamless whole and that reform in one
sphere would necessarily lead to progressive change in other areas."' 6
The law and development movement failed to recover from its setbacks and growing
levels of self-doubt by its erstwhile champions. The academics and policymakers that
drove the movement in the 1960s lost interest and the study of law and development
declined.' 7 While development aid for law reform did not cease altogether, foundations
also lost interest in the field. Nevertheless French and English scholars, together with a
number of African, Latin American, and Indian scholars, continued to research and write
on the subject, developing a rich body of material. Moreover, some lawyers in developing
countries continued-albeit in a somewhat ad hoc manner-to emulate the laws and the
development of legal institutions based on Western models.' 8
During the 1980s a new phase in the rule of law movement developed, this time under
the rubric of the administration of justice. Much of the activity in this period to promote
democracy through legal development was funded by U.S. agencies and foundations and
focused geographically on Latin America and Asia. The first round of reforms in Latin
America in the early 1980s concentrated primarily on criminal justice from the perspective
of limiting human rights abuses and ending the impunity of abusers.
The thrust of reforms in Latin America was the drafting and promulgation of new crim-
inal procedure codes.' 9 As it became apparent that new laws would not facilitate change
on their own, the scope of the reform was broadened to turn legal theory into practice.
New elements added to the reform typically included the creation of new criminal justice
institutions such as the prosecution and public defense, the restructuring and professional-
ization of existing criminal justice institutions such as the police, and the provision of new
equipment and infrastructure more compatible with the new procedural requirements.
14. Carol V. Rose, The "New" Law and Development Movement in the Post-Cold War Era: A Vietnam Case
Study, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 93, 93-94 (1998).
15. Trubek, supra note 10, at 78-79.
16. Id. at 79.
17. Id. at 81.
18. Tamanaha, supra note 5, at 474.
19. LINN A. HAMMERGREN, EN-vistoNING REFORM: LMPROVING JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE IN LATIN
AIERICA 11 (2007).
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By the end of the 1980s, increasing emphasis was placed on issues of judicial indepen-
dence, constitutionalism, the promotion of civil and political liberties, criminal law, and an
overall systemic approach to the development of formal legal systems.
USAID invested heavily in court reform efforts in Central America during this period.
In the mid-to-late 1980s, USAID initiated judicial projects to support the emergence of
more democratic regimes in South America, and "judicial improvement programmes" be-
gan to constitute a major component of USAID-sponsored democracy programmes in the
region. 20 The focus of this effort was to enhance the stature of the judiciary and thereby
strengthen democratizing efforts in Latin America. 21 Such initiatives included: increasing
courts' efficiency and effectiveness through court modernization efforts; "training judges;
hiring more judges, public defenders, and prosecutors . . . reforming penal codes; and
introducing career and merit appointments for judges and other judicial personnel." 22
After the end of the Cold War a vibrant rule of law movement developed. The end of
communism saw many countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union undergo
a dual transition to market economies and democratic rule. Rule of law supporters saw
these two issues linked; rule of law reform was necessary to buttress both. Beginning in
the early 1990s, "[t]he rule of law became the big tent for social, economic, and political
change generally." 23 The earlier-mainly U.S. based-supporters of the law and develop-
ment movement were now joined by a number of European bilateral and multilateral
donors and the multi-lateral development banks in support of rule of law reform efforts in
Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America.
During this period, "USAID broadened the geographic and analytic perspectives of its
law programs." 24 Because support for democracy was emerging as a major objective of
USAID, its missions around the world began "including law projects in the design and
implementation of country democracy programs." 25 Moreover, "the programmatic focus
and content of these efforts" began to encompass "a wider array of objectives, strategies,
and activities," including focusing on "issues of access, legal aid, and the mobilization of
public demand for legal reform." 26
More recently, large donors have begun supporting more comprehensive and integrated
programming; although, as experts point out, in practice this often means little more than
the pursuit of multiple objectives by combining a multitude of project components. The
result is that any strategic linkages among goals and project components and activities are
weak.27
Poverty reduction has also taken on new prominence in the rule of law programming of
a number of large bilateral donors. "Poverty-focused judicial reform programs have as a
goal expansion of the human rights agenda to include social and economic rights-for ex-
ample, poverty alleviation and health care." 28
20. BLAIR & HAvsEN, supra note 7, at 8-9.
21. Id. at 9.
22. Id.
23. Jensen, srpra note 2, at 347.
24. BLAIR & HANSEN, stpra note 7, at 9.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 9-10.
27. See HAMAERGREN, supra note 19.
28. Jensen, supra note 2, at 348.
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C. WHAT HAs THE MOVEMENr LEARNED?
There are three levels of intensity when it comes to the different rule of law reform
efforts that have been supported by donors in the post-Cold War era. 29 At the first level,
the focus is on laws themselves-revising laws and frequently changing whole codes, as in
the case of Latin America, where criminal procedure codes based on the inquisitorial sys-
tem have been replaced with those based on adversarial criminal proceedings.30 In addi-
tion to criminal laws, changes have been made to constitutional law, commercial law, and
administrative law.31
The second level of reform concentrates on changing and reforming law-related institu-
tions. That is to make courts, prosecution services, policing agencies, public defender
institutions, and, at times, prison administrations and law schools "more competent, effi-
cient, and accountable."32 In practical terms, this includes the development of training
programmes for criminal justice actors, better salaries and working conditions for judges,
prosecutors, and police, and the development of ethic codes and professional standards.33
The third level concerns increasing governments' compliance with the law, particularly
with respect to judicial independence.34 Success for this type of reform depends signifi-
cantly on an enlightened political leadership and the ability to bring about substantial
"changes in the values and attitudes of those [who hold political] power." 35 Very often the
impetus for such reforms must come from the domestic political, economic, and social
elite.36 Unlike the law and development theorists who thought that modern institutions
and bureaucracies would facilitate change, the modem rule of law movement is based on
the belief that change does not come naturally from key institutions but, rather, is depen-
dent on key individuals.
In the recent past, most rule of law aid has focused on the first two levels of reform,
partly because these types of reforms are relatively easy to achieve. But the most impor-
tant-even crucial-element of successful reform that is both sustainable and has the po-
tential to have real impact on the ground are the reforms falling under the third level.
EI. The Current Rule of Law Challenge*
Exploring how rule of law assistance emerged and evolved over the course of more than
four decades provides insight into understanding what specific objectives these efforts
tried to achieve and the theories and the legacies left behind.
As this discussion moves into examining how well rule of law strategies have worked, it
is useful to set the stage by taking a broad look at how societies have progressed in terms
of instituting rule of law. In doing so, an analysis of findings through the lens provided by








* Jennifer Windsor authored this section. Lisa Davis, Deputy Director of Programs at Freedom House,
contributed to its development.
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Freedom House's Freedom in the World survey, Freedom House's annual assessment of
political rights and civil liberties, which has been underway for over three decades, is
useful to set the stage.37
The Freedom in the World methodology gives significant weight to rule of law. Rule of
law is one of the four main components of the civil liberties rating, along with "freedoms
of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights . . . and personal auton-
omy" and individual rights.38 Under the rule of law component, Freedom House evalu-
ates four areas: the independence of the judiciary, civilian control of the security forces,
the population's level of protection from unjustified imprisonment and torture or other
abuse, including war and insurgencies, and equal treatment of all people.39 The Freedom
House approach therefore tries to assess the quality of rule of law-whether and how
justice is actually delivered and experienced-by citizens within countries.
If one analyzes trends from the last ten years, it is clear that progress in rule of law
components lags behind other indicators, even in some countries in the world that are
generally considered to be on the right track in other areas, including political rights. For
example, in the Latin America region, over seventy percent of the countries are in the
"Free" category.40 Most of the countries have received relatively good ratings for electo-
ral processes, political pluralism, and freedom of association.4' Scores remain very low,
however, in the area of rule of law and other areas in the overall civil liberties area.42
The reasons behind the lack of progress vary from country to country and region to
region, but a few general observations are worth remembering. First, the lack of progress
in the area of rule of law is typically not simply a result of too few trained lawyers or
courthouses, but is due to the fact that the most important political actors within the
country have not adequately backed reform. In the end, a rule of law system is a reflection
of the underlying socio-political contract that exists within a society. Rule of law reforms
can and do alter the balance of economic and political power within the country. Second,
the state is not the only source of constraints on improvements in rule of law. The persis-
tence of violence has negatively affected rule of law and human rights within many socie-
ties, and non-state actors, such as criminal gangs and armed extremist forces, can be major
perpetrators of such violence.
37. FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2009: TiHE ANNuAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL RIGHTS
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (2009), http://www.freedombouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana-page=352&
year=2009.
38. Id. at Methodology, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfin?page=351&ana-page=354&year=
2009.
39. Under the four main areas of the rule of law component, there are additional detailed questions. See id.
at Checklist Questions and Guidelines, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana-page=
355&year=2009.
40. Id. at Map of Freedom in the World, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=
2009.
41. Arch Puddington, Findings of Freedom in the World 2008-Freedom in Retreat: Is the Tide Turning?, in
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A. IMPLICATIONS FOR RULE OF LAW STRATEGIES
What are the implications then for programmatic strategies? First, rule of law strate-
gies should not be seen only through an institutional capacity-building lens but must also
take into account the political context and how such programs are affecting different
stakeholders within that society. Obviously, the international community has a limited
ability to impact internal politics within a country, but it can be aware of power imbal-
ances and seek to create incentives for positive reform in the design and implementation
of programs. The process of assessing political contexts and balances should consider the
different and changing power dynamics.
Second, there is a need to integrate human rights more explicitly into the design of rule
of law programs. Strengthening rule of law should be focused on producing a system that
delivers fundamental human rights to all the citizens within a society. Therefore, a
greater emphasis on working with and in support of indigenous human rights defenders
should be part of rule of law strategies.
Frontline human rights defenders are a key factor in pushing for rule of law reform,
evaluating the performance of the justice system to render justice, seeking redress for
victims, educating the public and government, and demanding accountability on the part
of government and, increasingly so, non-state actors to both respect and protect human
rights. A recent example of the crucial role that human rights defenders can play is the
process leading up to the conviction of former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori in
April 2009.43 The efforts of Peruvian human rights defenders44 to investigate and docu-
ment human rights abuses, to successfully advocate for the creation of a National Com-
mission for Truth Reconciliation Commission and thereafter turn over information to it,
and to represent victims' families during the prosecution ultimately succeeded in holding a
former head of state accountable to the rule of law.45 The leadership and tenacity of the
talented individuals in the Peruvian human rights community should be applauded. They
worked for more than a decade to gain redress and to change the Peruvian legal system
from within.46 Their efforts were partly supported by key members of the international
community.4 7
Human rights defenders can play an important role even in repressive environments.
For example, local human rights Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) now sit on
policy and law drafting groups alongside Kazakhstani government drafters. 48 While few
of their recommendations make it into law, the human rights community receives early
information, formulates sound analysis, and has effectively used these to block restrictive
43. Adriana Leon & Chris Kraul, Er-Peru President Fujimori Convicted of Mass Murder, Kidnapping, LA
TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at Al7, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/08/world/fg-fujimori8.
44. The Peruvian National Coordinator for Human Rights is an umbrella organization coordinating the
work of sixty-seven human rights groups in Peru. It is dedicated to reporting human rights violations, repre-
senting victims, and advocating for respect to human rights and international humanitarian law.
45. Posting of Ricardob to Blog de ia Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos, httpJ/
blog.dhperu.orgPp=6033 (an. 5, 2010, 10:18 UTC-5).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Marston-Nicholson, Civil Society: Kazakbstan to encourage NGO-Activities, KA7Au-irm LiVE, Oct. 19,
2009, http://www.kazakhstanlive.com/2.aspx?ProdlD=88627a56-4bff-476c-898e-9305abd3c2 I1&CatlD=9f9f
8034-6dd6-4f7e-adef-Of6a7cD406d9&sr=100&page=1.
VOL. 44, NO. 2
PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD 847
laws from passing and gain commitments to further reform. A new generation of human
rights activists using the blogosphere has also had an impact in Egypt. The now well-
known blogger Wael Abbas- released a video of an instance of torture by authorities on
YouTube.50 This video and others shared by him led to investigations and prosecutions of
police responsible for the abuses and also encouraged the public to stand up against abu-
sive practices and demand redress.5
The work of human rights defenders to monitor, report, and demand a system based on
rule of law comes with great risk to themselves, their families, and their livelihoods. What
helps defenders survive and continue their work is international recognition as legitimate
actors in society through the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders,
adopted in December 1998,52 and subsequent regional and country guidelines, interna-
tional and domestic protection through precautionary measures,s> diplomatic interven-
tion, and sound self-protection strategies.
Rule of law program support helps human rights defenders in similar circumstances
share best-use practices with regional exchanges and regional or global human rights de-
fenders networks.54 The provision of emergency funds for legal defense, medical ex-
penses, or temporary relocation also provides a lifeline when defenders are under the most
duress. International funding for their institutional support and training and tools to en-
hance their professional capability and credibility has also made an impact. Examples in-
clude training in human rights investigations, analysis, comparative and international law
reform, sharing of innovative documentation software tools (e.g., HURIDOCS and Mar-
tus) and secure information technology sharing strategies, and travel funds and inclusion
in delegations of like-minded organizations at regional and international human rights
forums.
Because of political imbalances in more repressive societies, political opposition to real
rule of law reform and fundamental human rights protection hinders this type of rule of
law program support. There is now a direct backlash by autocratic regimes against do-
mestic efforts to strengthen democracy and foreign democracy assistance. Since 2004,
49. Mr. Abbas is the recipient of the 2007 Knight Journalism Excellence Award. Dawn Arteaga, Egyptian
Blogger, Burmese Reporter Named 2007 Knight Int'l Journalirm Award Winners, KNIGHT FOUND., Aug. 24,
2007, http://www.knightfoundation.org/news/press-room/knight-press-releases/detail.dot?id=137205.
50. Jeffrey Fleishman, A Blog as National Conscience, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 2008, at A3, available at http://
articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/08/world/fg-blogger8; Riz Khan, Blogy in Egypt, YouTUBE, Sept. 5, 2007,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xK-h3fQkmGY&NR=1.
51. Fleishman, supra note 50.
52. Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups, & Organs of Society to Promote &
Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms, G.A. Res. 53/144, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/53/144 (Mar. 8, 1999), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/defenders/docs/declaration/
declaration.pdf.
53. One organization that offers such protection is the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. See
Inter-American Comn'n on Human Rights, What is the IACHR?, http://www.cidh.org/what.htm (last vis-
ited Sept. 1, 2009), such as The Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights, http://www.cidh.org/
DefaultE.htm.
54. Press Release, Freedom House, Regional Democracy Conference Welcomed (Nov. 12, 2003), available
at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=139.
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over twenty countries worldwide have introduced restrictive regulations undermining civil
society actors, particularly those working in the field of human rights and rule of law. 55
Taking on a superficially legalistic character, regimes attack irregularities in an organi-
zation's registration, stifle work through unwieldy tax or labor inspections, close organiza-
tions with missions deemed "hostile to the national interest," and restrict direct
international funding and technical assistance for human rights defenders.5 6 One of the
most recent and egregious examples is the new Charities and Societies Law enacted in
January 2009 in Ethiopia, which restricts organizations receiving more than ten percent of
their funding from foreign sources from conducting any activity advancing human rights
or the promotion of the efficiency of the justice and law enforcement services, among
other restricted activities. 57 Bloggers reporting on corruption and human rights violations
in China, Egypt, Iran, and other similarly repressive environments find themselves under
arrest for uncovering human rights or other rule of law abuses.58
B. WHERE DOES THE MOVEMENT GO FROM HERE?
The international community must redouble its efforts in spite of the backlash to con-
tinue to recognize human rights defenders, include them in the rule of law reform
processes, and protect them from the backlash. With properly leveraged influence from
foreign human rights groups, rule of law implementers, international organizations, and
the diplomatic community, local human right defenders can get, and remain, seated at
policy and law reform tables, ensure that they keep their legal registration, and maintain
access while in prisons and jails and to international forums. The pressure leading up to
and surrounding the decision of Kazakhstan to take over the chairmanship of the Organi-
zation for Security and Coopertation in Europe has created the space for human rights
defenders in their policy reform debate.59
Human rights defenders need to be credible and qualified in their work, and thus rule of
law programming should include human rights defenders as training participants on sub-
stantive and comparative law content. Efforts by the UN Office of High Commission for
Human Rights to not only train governments, but also human rights groups, in report
preparation for the Universal Peer Review process within the Human Rights Council are
a valuable initiative. Defenders arrested or otherwise harmed in their work continue to
need lifelines of emergency funding support and diplomatic support.
Because one of the most effective ways that autocratic governments suppress human
rights activism is to isolate activists from their peers and support networks in the interna-
tional community, new initiatives and support for regional and global networks is impor-
tant. While resources available to civil society will never match those of the governments
they confront, they can be strengthened both by diminishing their relative isolation and
55. David Moore, Safeguarding Civil Society in Politically Complex Environments, TIIE INT'L J. NOT-FOR-
PROFrr L., June 2007, at 3, available at http-//www.icn.org/KnoWeDge/ijnl/vol9iss3/special_1.htm.
56. Jennifer Windsor, Stand up to Global Bullies Who Beat Back Democratic Progress, CiiusmuN SCIENCE
MONrrOR, Oct. 25, 2006, available at http://www.freedoinhouse.org/template.cfm?page=72&release=431.
57. Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 (15th Year, No. 25, 2009) (Eth.).
58. Blogger Arrests Hit Record High, BBC NEws, June 16, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7456357.stm.
59. Press Release, Freedom House, Kazakhstan Pledges to Improve Democratic Performance in Compro-
mise Decision to Assume OSCE Chairmanship in 2010; Freedom House Urges Monitoring of Implementa-
tion (Dec. 3, 2007), available at http-//www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=594.
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by coming together in joint or concurrent engagement on critical human rights issues in
regional or global venues.
IV. What Needs Revisiting?*
For those who have worked in the rule of law field over the years, the one thing they
have learned is how little they really know. Before, it appeared so easy. When asked to
construct a rule of law reform strategy, practitioners would readily propose passing a few
laws, train some judges and prosecutors, maybe a few defense attorneys for good measure,
stand up a few courts, and introduce a case management system and all would be well. But
as time went on, and the anticipated changes in society did not come about, rule of law
reformers began to realize that strengthening rule of law is a much more complex and
nuanced endeavor. The reality hit us that it is not just about fixing a set of static systems
in a technical and mechanical way. The fact is, humans are involved in the equation, and
that very dimension changes the game.
Further, complex systems of historical, social, political, and economic factors directly
impact all rule of law reform efforts. As Freedom House's survey and methodology
demonstrate, 60 examining how poorly rule of law indicators perform, as compared to
other indicators, signals that rule of law efforts cannot be conceived, implemented, and
evaluated in isolation. They are the result of many elements and factors such as how the
justice system responds to human rights violations, how different forces contribute to fos-
tering conflict, and how any given society contributes with its practices to upholding it or
not.
This section will give an overview of three themes for consideration while pondering
"what needs revisiting" as the rule of law field evolves into the future and works to find
ways to create a system where all people have equal access to justice, all persons are held
accountable, everyone's human rights are protected, and their safety and security ensured.
The three themes that capture what needs revisiting are: 1) rule of law is about people,
not widgets; 2) whose reform agenda is this anyway; and 3) everyone is connected and
reform efforts affect one another.
A. RULE OF LAw REFORM Is ABOUT PEOPLE, NOT WIDGETS
Historically, the focus has been on taking a "top down" approach whereby the attention
was on institutional reform. The thought was that reform from the top would then trickle
down through the institution and society; thus, rule of law would be established. The
focus was on the technical aspect of reform such as getting the parliament to pass laws,
institutions to train personnel, and the institutions themselves to function. Not that these
aspects should be ignored, but they are only a small part of a larger rule of law system.
Reformers have learned that the "formal" system of justice, such as courts and institutions,
is not always the only game in town. In fact, legal plurality is often the norm.
* Colette Rausch authored this section. It is based on her personal work experiences in different
countries.
60. See FRFEDOM HoUSE, supra note 37.
SUMMER 2010
850 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
This means that many different systems of justice may be in operation. For example, in
Afghanistan, the formal justice system does not operate in most of the country. 61 Instead,
various non-state or traditional systems are in existence and serve to resolve conflicts.62 In
some countries, tribal leaders or elders may mete out justice rather than judges in a court-
house.63 Practitioners have learned in rule of law reform that their definition of a justice
system must be expanded and they must be willing to work to understand how various
societies seek resolution of conflict in search of justice. Practitioners have also learned
that some systems may not encapsulate their notions of "justice," especially as it relates to
women, minority groups, or people without financial means. But oftentimes practitioners
need to work outside their comfort zone and work with what exists.
For example, United States Institute of Peace (USIP) works in a number of countries to
understand how the various justice systems operate and then tries to work with national
actors to find ways developing functioning systems that meet the demands of justice and
are fair to those they serve.64
Additionally, USIP realizes that both the process and the people who are part of rule of
law reform, both from the international assistance side and the national actor side, are
critical. Specifically, oftentimes "how" USIP proceeds is more important than "what"
USIP reforms and those who are involved in the process can make the difference between
reform happening or not. For example, simply having an external actor determine what
laws are needed, drafting the law for a country, pushing the country to adopt it, and then
getting it adopted does not guarantee that law will be enforced by the institutions or even
accepted by society at large.
On the contrary, chances may be better for acceptance and enforcement if a process
included national consultation on what laws are needed, prioritization, and how best to
approach the reform process.65 Further, resources will not be wasted and duplicative laws
will not be passed. For example, much effort was made to draft a traffic law for Kosovo in
the early days of the UN mission in that country. Not long after the law was finally
drafted, it was discovered that a traffic law already existed and could have been amended, if
needed, in a fraction of the time spent drafting a new one.
Something else of note is that rule of law reform is not a linear process. It is more
organic, meaning it evolves over time and does not follow a predictable pattern of starting
with A and then always following with B and then C. Rather, one is more likely to find
that you start with B, followed by C and D and then back to A before moving on to E.
One donor (donor #1) spent large amounts of money and time to conduct a very in-depth
assessment of what could be done in the security and justice sectors of a country coming
out of conflict. After the assessment, a multi-dimensional strategy was developed to ad-
dress all sectors. Now, this is a good thing. It is always good to have a strategy and to
scope out the entire justice and security universe.
61. THoMAs BARFIELD, ET AL.., U.S. INsT. OF PEACE, THE CLASH OF Two GOODS: STATE & NON-




64. U.S. Inst. of Peace, Our Work, http-//www.usip.org/about-us/our-work (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
65. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and TransitionalJustice in Con-
flict and Post-Conflict Societies, I X, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 24, 2004).
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But, it is what one does next that is the key. In this particular case, the donor could not
figure out the "entry point" because donor #1 wanted to be able to work on all the sectors
in a coordinated fashion given the inter-linkages between them. Now, yes, in an ideal
world, this is how reform would progress. But the world is not ideal. So donor #1 strug-
gled and kept meeting with the country officials and trying to determine where to begin.
After two years, the country officials grew tired of the frequent visits of donor #1's high-
priced consultants who flew in again and again to meet with the country officials and
ponder what to do. The country officials grew frustrated, wanted donor #1 to just start
somewhere and explained to donor #1 that rule of law reform as a process is sometimes
organic and not as organized as everyone would all wish.
They further explained that it would be more productive to create an entry point that
could be the foundation that could be built upon to develop the bridge to the other shore.
Waiting at the shore of the river and not crossing at any point means you are not getting
anywhere in the reform process. By contrast, another donor (donor #2) took a different
approach and what started out as a small entry point blossomed into outreach into a few
sectors just two years later. Donor #2 operated with the belief that with each step taken,
other opportunities will be presented along the way. Further, donor #2 gained the trust
and built a relationship with the country officials that were grateful for donor #2's willing-
ness to work with them and start small on something that was meaningful for the country.
This trust and relationship building created the foundation necessary for success. Mean-
while, donor #1 continued to stand on the shore, paralyzed by the desire to find the per-
fect timing and a perfect whole sector strategy.
As for the people involved, time and again, practitioners have seen that there are actors
(national and international) who are more interested in enhancing their own financial or
career interests and are not focused on service to the broader goal of enhancing rule of law
toward establishing a peaceful society. Experience has demonstrated that without a criti-
cal core of change agents in the mix and supportive leadership at the top, reform will be
stifled. These factors, together with grassroots support, can pave the way for positive
change. At the same time, experience has shown that you often only need a few change
agents and one or two openings at the top, and that can be the start of significant reform
opportunities. With all the daunting challenges in rule of law reform in countries emerg-
ing from conflict, one should never underestimate the power of a few committed people
who work together toward a common service-oriented end.
In addition to a greater focus on process, another area that needs revisiting is the impor-
tance of what are often called "soft skills" in engaging in rule of law reform. These skills
include understanding culture, treating people fairly and with respect, and understanding
the role of outsiders. One example of this is what happened in Liberia.
According to a Liberian government official, they were experiencing an increase in es-
capes while transferring prisoners from the court to the detention facility. The interna-
tional actors present in the country tried to grapple, without success, with this problem.
None of these international actors considered asking the country's nationals how this
might be resolved. So, the country's justice sector actors watched as the problem esca-
lated. Finally, out of exasperation, an international actor asked one of the country's justice
sector actors, what to do. In seconds, the country's official came up with a solution. She
suggested that rather than transporting detainees to and from the court and detention
facility, the court proceedings be brought to the detention facility. But what stuck in the
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mind of the country's official was how foreigners were in her country, who failed to work
to view things in the country's experiences and culture, dismissed the competence of the
"locals," and assumed they could solve everything themselves. So, as she explained, she
and her colleagues figured that when the internationals were good and ready, they would
come to their senses and ask for help where they should have asked in the first place.
B. WHOSE REFORM AGENDA IS THis ANYWAY?
Many come to the field of rule of law reform with the vision that the country is a blank
slate just waiting for an outsider to come in and set things straight. Over time, many who
have this view realize that this is not the case and begin to reflect on a number of ques-
tions. These questions include: What is the role of the outsider? What can practitioners
actually do in a country and what is even possible to do?
Further, even for those who hold tight to the view that change must always be forced,
the questions are: Change the environment in their own image? If so, which image,
country, system? Due to the nature of rule of law reform, there are multiple agencies,
donors, and countries, operating-sometimes competing-within the borders of one
country emerging from conflict. Chaos is often caused by many dueling and conflicting
reform efforts. Many reformers are pushing for immediate results in what takes a stable
and well-resourced country many, many years to develop. The reality is that rule of law
reform is more organic than international reformers want to accept and less in their con-
trol then they want to admit. Sometimes, no combination of carrots (incentives) and
sticks (imposed consequences) will get local officials to what reformers are promoting.
This is not to say that incentives and consequences are irrelevant, but they should be
carefully measured to fit the situation and should not be seen as the solution in all cases.
So, many reformers have come back to a less-is-more approach. They promote an
ethos of working with what exists and going from there. Sometimes what exists may not
be perfect, but it is what is known, and it generally works at some level. Taking this
approach can help promote stability and a strong foundation upon which to develop. The
alternative is constant reform efforts resulting in instability and uncertainty. For example,
in Kosovo following the arrival of an international assistance mission, the first year was
spent in what seemed like an endless process of law reform including passing many regula-
tions and totally overhauling the existing criminal code and criminal procedure code.
Countless hours and attention were diverted to what evolved into a futile process.
Perhaps a better approach would have been to use the laws that existed (with a few
minor changes to deal with international standards related to arrest and detention) and
deal with the problems at hand rather than launch immediately into an intensive law re-
form and law promulgation process that resulted in a legal chaos of sorts, with layers of
laws on top of other laws and lack of clarity as to how to apply it all together.
Another question relates to the role of the foreigner. One often hears about "experts"
being sent to a country to help. Just that very term denotes a superior being imbued with
knowledge greater and more important than those with whom he or she will be engaging.
In a South Asian country emerging from conflict, this term is not appreciated by the
"experts" national counterparts. If asked, one will often hear that the national justice sec-
tor actors prefer having "resource persons" come and, on equal footing, share ideas,
thoughts, and case studies. The national counterparts can then consider and determine
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how these ideas could be adapted or used in the country's context. The operative word
here is "share" and not tell. A natural consequence to this sharing is that international
reformers then cannot control the outcome. They can facilitate the process, but then
need to let go of the notion of a predetermined outcome. Further, things may not move
as quickly as international reformers would hope. But it is okay that a step or two is taken
because it is movement. Then later, maybe another step will be taken, and another. This
is how most things change. Finally, the process and end state may not look exactly how
international reformers had planned. But it may work for that country, and that is more
important than it looking like the foreigner's country.
Another example is in the context of Afghanistan's law reform efforts. A workshop was
held for the country's lawyers and officials engaged in reforming their criminal procedure
code. The goal was for the country's participants to have a dialogue with their foreign
counterparts who had experience in comparative law and criminal procedure reform. Un-
fortunately, things turned around and the first half of the workshop ended up being a
number of the foreign counterparts arguing why the draft prepared by the national actors
was insufficient and how they should fix it. These foreign counterparts were operating on
one channel.
The Afghans were attempting to ask questions and explain where they were coming
from, including all the challenges facing any law reform effort in the country. But they
were not getting the helpful responses they were asking for and were operating on a dif-
ferent channel than the foreign actors. Instead, the Afghans were being talked "at" and
"down to" by some of the foreign actors. After about a day and a half of escalating ten-
sions and communications breakdowns, the facilitators decided to break the groups into
two. This allowed the national actors to work on their own, using the input they did get
from the members of the foreign group who took the more constructive route of sharing
and dialoguing rather than dictating. In the end, much to the surprise of the more vocal
foreign group, the national actors succeeded in making major revisions and the entire
process was moved forward further than the more vocal group thought possible. The
national actors simply needed constructive dialogue, not dictation, and time on their own
to sort it through.
C. EVERYONE IS CONNECTED AND REFORM EFFORTS AFFECT ONE ANOTHER
If one were to look at rule of law reform as if looking at it from standing on the moon,
one would get a much better perspective of how it works. In fact, one would see the vast
networks of connections that comprise rule of law reform. It is these connections that
everyone needs to ever be reminded of, and everyone needs to operate with the knowledge
that rule of law reform cannot be approached in a vacuum.
Let's first just look at the rule of law reform sphere alone. Just this sphere includes (this
is illustrative not conclusive) the formal system of courts, prosecutors, lawyers, judges, etc.
Then there are other systems such as tribal courts or religious leaders as arbiters. Then
there are the oversight mechanisms such as human rights commissions, ombudspersons,
and parliamentarian oversight bodies.
It then includes a dizzying array of assistance providers and donors. Some donors are
taking a top down approach; some are taking a bottom up approach. Some are acting out
of their national security or other national interests. Some act out of humanitarian inter-
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est. The point is, not everyone (or anyone) is always on the same page and has a meeting
of the minds, yet all are operating in the same sphere and all affect each other. Then there
are other spheres that directly impact the rule of law sphere. These include the govern-
ance and economic sphere, for example. Rule of law reform is affected by history and
unresolved aspirations and abuses on a war-torn population.
These issues can result in continued violence and insecurity as groups fight it out for
access to power or justice. Some countries' reform efforts are stuck due to a political
situation where political interference in the justice sector is caused by unresolved conflicts,
angry and marginalized groups, economic disparity, or a rigid social structure.
In many countries, there are power structures that are often entrenched and those who
have it don't want to give it up. The result is that rule of law reform efforts that threaten
these power bases are quashed or stymied. But it is not always the national power interests
at play alone. There are international actor power interests as well. For example, country
A was engaged in a security and rule of law reform effort and had been engaged for almost
three years. It was a well-established program that was driven by change agents and had
been embraced by national actors who were engaged in the program because it was locally
developed and owned and met the needs of the country. Countries B and C, however, did
not want country A to be engaged because both countries felt that this was their "terri-
tory." So countries B and C put pressure on the officials to not work with county A.
Furthermore, country B duplicated country A's program and worked to initiate it.
In summary, there are many factors outside the rule of law sphere that directly affect
rule of law reform. These factors run through the core of rule of law reform. It is like a
thread that when you pull on one piece, depending upon how hard you pull, it can either
all come together, or all unravel. Because it is, after all, all connected.
V. Conclusion*
Discussing the state and aftermath of rule of law promotion efforts through critical lens
can be a daunting task but, as seen so far, not an impossible one. It demands an intellec-
tual exercise based on a process that is open to understanding the evolution of rule of law
promotion efforts, the challenges and conflicts confronted today, and a willingness to re-
visit what is left in order to envision its future. That was the original intention of this
collective discussion.
But the participants of this dialogue went beyond their scope of work. They revisited
original assumptions and challenged the status quo in order to generate more than an-
other discussion on the rule of law. As a result, one could affirm that a meeting of the
minds has occurred.
This dialogue generated a new common understanding that accents critical and ex-
tremely helpful insights, in an integrated manner, to some of the most compelling issues
rule of law promotion efforts abroad confront and that the rule of law community of
practitioners needs to act upon once and for all. This dialogue did so in an integrated
manner and approach that looks at the complexity of the field, the problems and its chal-
lenges, and the richness and diversity of the societies in which it operates as illustrated by
* Lelia Mooney authored this section.
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Jennifer Windsor's discussion in light of the Freedom in the World 2009 rule of law in-
dicators analysis.
The discussion on rule of law promotion efforts abroad is not a lineal exercise and can
neither be conducted in isolation from the context nor disconnected from the people's
lives, hopes, and aspirations as they seek to improve their quality of life free from conflict,
as Colette Rausch implores.
Moreover, this discussion involves several narratives and experiences while imparting
some lessons (or tasks) learned that urge some attention and demand a different kind of
action as no rule of law reform or effort is sustainable without key individuals, and average
citizens, engaging in this process as well and taking ownership, as Martin Schonteich
notes.
A. WHAT ARE SoME OF THESE LESSONS AND TASKS?
While embarking on the reform of legal frameworks to enable indigenous legal envi-
ronments is a necessary element of any rule of law promotion effort, legal reform will not
achieve some or any of these goals by itself. At the same time, merely strengthening the
institutional infrastructure of a justice sector (without looking at whether human rights
abuses are punished and civil and political liberties are respected and upheld) should not
be the central focus or unique end result of the development of any capacity building
effort.
Designing rule of law reform and programming without taking into consideration the
different political arrangements of any particular society, how state and non-state actors
contribute to stabilize or de-stabilize conflict or post-conflict societies, may not generate
the expected results and would probably lead to failure. Designing and implementing rule
of law programming without a deep understanding of the society's traditional dispute res-
olution practices and their interaction with formal systems of justice, cultural patterns,
legal traditions, and ways of dealing with conflict, and without involving the most critical
stakeholders and actors may lead to the indigenous rejection of these initiatives without
fostering any change and achieving any sustainability.
Measuring success and monitoring progress are critical components of any rule of law
effort. It is still an exercise and a pending task for the field and community of practition-
ers. While looking at analytical frameworks that focus on both process and impact evalua-
tions are a very important element of these initiatives, lessons learned should focus on
what works and what does not, instead of only producing end project reports and assess-
ments that highlight success stories and best practices that do not provide critical insights
that could help avoid making the same mistakes in any host country over and over again.
This critical exploration on what works and what does not demands from both the rule
of law field and community of practitioners that they get out of their own expertise and
programmatic comfort zone. As challenges to the rule of law evolve in complexity and
stubbornness, so must practitioners evolve and develop more creative, holistic, multi-dis-
ciplinary, cross-sector, demand driven, and coordinated interventions (where sometimes
working with the courts, the legislature or the rest of justice sector institutions may not be
the only response to the problems confronted and there may be a need to look at what the
community is offering). This requires creative, strategic, and tactical thinking and acting
that needs technical expertise combined with multi-disciplinary framework that explores
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what is the role of rule of law promotion efforts within a particular context and when
should it be more appropriate (prevention, stabilization, reconstruction, conflict, post-
conflict and humanitarian scenarios).
The rule of law community of practitioners needs to have a candid and direct conversa-
tion on its lessons learned, setbacks, and future challenges. It owes it to the growing rule
of law community of practitioners. It also owes it to the ultimate recipients: the citizens
and their societies. As a result, rule of law promotion efforts will emerge as a more legiti-
mate process where strategies and programming, instead of focusing on merely highly
technical capacity building and reform approaches, could contribute to making long last-
ing impact.
Finally, the ultimate measure of success lies somewhere else. It is very personal and it
has a human face. It is based on whether the average citizen, the folk on the ground, has
the certainty he or she can trust justice sector institutions while at the same time feels
confident his or her human rights, civil liberties, and political freedoms are respected and
enforced in an inclusive, fair, secure, stable, and peaceful environment promoted and de-
fended by the government66 and that there are effective, responsive, and accountable sys-
tems of governance.
66. Lelia Mooney, Introductory Note to Inter-American juridical Committee: Resolution on the Esyential and
Fundamental Elements of Representative Democracy and their Relation to Collective Action within the Framework of
the Inter-American Democratic Charter, 48 I.L.M. 1233 (2009).
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